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Beyond the Travelling Model? Strategic Usage and Hybridisation of Performance-based 
Financing (PBF) in Health in Burundi 
Keywords: performance-based financing, health policy, global health, travelling model, 
Burundi 
Performance-based Financing (PBF) has travelled extensively in Africa. The analysis of 
interviews with key actors and grey literature shows that its implementation in Burundi 
corresponds to a strategic usage, as a tool for achieving a policy of selective free health-
care. It also reinforces a technocratic elite within the Ministry of Health. Grasping such 
political and strategic reterritorialisation is key to comprehend global health travelling 
models.  
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Over the last two decades, Performance-Based Financing (PBF) has emerged as one of the 
major reforms in health financing in Africa. In this approach, which first started in Africa in 
the Great Lakes region, health facilities are contracted and paid according to their level of 
activity, defined by a series of indicators1. From Mozambique to Senegal, 21 African countries 
are currently implementing PBF projects or policies. While public health researchers fiercely 
debate the effects of PBF on the use and functioning of health-care services2, much less is 
known of the socio-political dimension of its implementation. In order to understand PBF and 
its effects on the development of health policies in Africa, it is imperative to understand how 
what is described as the travelling model par excellence3 ─in other words, an intervention 
defined globally and implemented locally─ is re-territorialised or vernacularized to use Sally 
Engle Merry's term4. The ambition of this article is to go beyond what Antoine Vauchez calls 
the circulatory prism5, i.e. a problematisation centred on the journey of the model, and give 
room to the agency of national actors6. The study of the case of Burundi shows that the 'success' 
of PBF comes from its re-invention as a solution to a political issue apparently unrelated to 
PBF: the implementation of selective free health-care, as promised by the president of the 
Republic. The theoretical framework of the travelling model originally formulated by 
Rottenburg7 is used as an entry point to understand how and why the PBF approach became a 
reality in Burundi. However, to understand the centrality of PBF in Burundi, it is necessary to 
also fully integrate the strategic perspective of the national actors into this framework. 
The study's primary material consists of field observations conducted between 2009 and 2013, 
fifteen interviews conducted at that time, and seven additional interviews conducted with key 
actors in November 2018. These interviews with key actors (officials from different levels of 
the Ministry of Health, staff members of international governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, and donors), as well as the grey and academic literature, are analysed with 
particular attention to the different critical junctures of the PBF journey: pilot, scaling up8, and 
national implementation phases. Extensive grey literature on Burundi and PBF had already 
been collected as part of a previous study9; the main sources are the websites of the World 
Bank, the NGO Cordaid (Catholic Organization for Relief and Development Aid), Sina Health 
(a health consulting firm specialised in PBF), the PBF Community of Practice, and the Ministry 
of Health of Burundi. 
The following section locates the study within the field of research on the political economy of 
PBF in Africa. The paper then goes on to discuss why PBF appears to be a typical example of 
                                                             
1. < https://www.rbfhealth.org/projects> last accessed 24 sptember 2019. 
2. S. Mayaka Manitu, B. Meessen, M. Muvudi Lushimba et J. Macq, “Le débat autour du financement basé sur 
la performance en Afrique subsaharienne : analyse de la nature des tensions”, Santé publique, vol. 27, n° 1, 
2015, p. 117-128. 
3. P. Lavigne Delville, "Pour une socio-anthropologie de l'action publique in les pays 'sous régime d'aide'", 
Anthropologie & développement, 45, 2017, p. 33‑64 ; J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, “Les modèles voyageurs à 
l’épreuve des contextes et des normes pratiques : le cas de la santé maternelle”, in D. Pourette, C. Mattern, C. 
Bellas-Cabane, B. Ravololomanga (ed.), Femmes, enfants : Anthropologie et santé à partir de Madagascar, 
Paris, 2018, p. 83‑100. 
4. S.E. Merry, P. Levitt, "The Vernacularization of Women's Human Rights,”in S. Merry, P. Levitt. Hopgood, J. 
Snyder, L. Vinjamuri (ed.), Human Rights Futures, Cambridge, 2018, p. 213‑236 ; S.E. Merry, “Transnational 
Human Rights and Local Activism”, American Anthroplogist, 108, 1, 2006, p. 38‑51. 
5. A. Vauchez, "Le prisme circulatoire. Retour sur un leitmotiv académique", Critique internationale, 59, 2, 
2013, p. 9 
6. Their capacity to act coherently towards a chosen end. T. By Herdt and J. Bastiaensen. “L’agencéité 
relationnelle”. Revue Tiers Monde, 2, 2009, pp.317-333. 
7. R. Rottenburg, Far-fetched facts: a parable of development aid (Vol. 2). 2002. Lucius & Lucius. 
8. Transition from a small-scale pilot projet to a nationwide scheme. 
9. M.P. Bertone, J.-B. Falisse, G. Russo, S. Witter, “Context matters (but how and why?) A hypothesis-led 
literature review of performance based financing in fragile and conflict-affected health systems”, PLOS ONE, 
13, 4, 2018, p. e0195301. 
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travelling model, and some of the potential conceptual and heuristic difficulties associated with 
this approach. It is followed by an analysis of the political and strategic aspects of the 
implementation of PBF in Burundi. The relevance of the analytical prism and the qualification 
of PBF as a "travelling model" is eventually discussed.  
Research on the political economy of PBF  
Since the beginning of the 2000s, PBF has generated a dense academic literature that focuses 
mainly on the technical aspects of the approach's implementation and its effects on the quality 
and use of health services. As is often the case in global health, the authors include 
practitioners, consultants and researchers. The boundaries between these categories are 
sometimes blurred: some authors wear several hats, and many are entangled in various 
transnational networks. The last systematic review of the effects of PBF by the highly respected 
Cochrane Foundation was completed in 2012 and concluded that "the current evidence base is 
too weak to draw general conclusions"10. The present article focuses on a different topic: the 
political economy of PBF. Social science research at this level is currently structured around 
three main strands. 
The first strand focuses on the characterisation of PBF. Even if they sometimes disagree on the 
most appropriate vocabulary11, most researchers agree to reject a minimal definition of PBF as 
a simple scheme for implementing financial incentives for health care providers12. Thus, PBF 
must be understood as a system, which implies a redefinition of relationships between the actors 
of the health system and an overhaul of the functioning of the health facilities13. As the rest of 
this article will show, national actors in Burundi also have this broad understanding of PBF. 
The second strand aims at understanding the debate on PBF in the public space and academic 
literature. In his doctoral thesis, Serge Mayaka Manitu documents an opposition on the 
interpretation of facts, which, he notes, are too often marked by individualised experiences of 
researchers, elevated to the rank of generalities14. The opposition is also ideological; it is about 
the neo-liberal inspiration of PBF, which is in line with New Public Management type of 
reforms, i.e. the promotion of private-sector mechanisms in the public sector. The last major 
confrontation on PBF took place in mid-2018 in the columns of the British Medical Journal: 
Global Health. Elisabeth Paul and her colleagues wrote a commentary calling for a questioning 
of the PBF approach15, describing it as a "process controlled by international consultants and 
agencies to the detriment of local initiatives and ownership of stakeholders in the field". The 
                                                             
10. A new version is due in 2020. S. Witter, A. Fretheim, F. Kessy, A. Lindahl, “Paying for performance to 
improve the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries”, Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews, 2, 2012 
11. Different institutions call it different names. I use "performance-based financing", which is the term most 
commonly used in Burundi and is described by the World Bank as referring to a "financial incentive paid to 
health care providers” and falls within the broader category of  "results-based financing” mechanisms (which 
may involve patients, for example). See P. Musgrove, P., Rewards for good performance or results: a short 
glossary. World Bank, Washington, DC. 2010. 
12. D. Renmans, N. Holvoet, B. Criel, B. Meessen, “Performance-based financing: The same is different”, 
Health Policy and Planning, 32, 6, 2017, p. 860‑868. 
13. Z.C. Shroff, N. Tran, B. Meessen, M. Bigdeli, A. Ghaffar, "Taking Results-Based Financing from Scheme to 
System", Health Systems & Reform, 3, 2, 2017, p. 69‑73. 
14. See: S. Mayaka Manitu et al., “Le débat autour…”, art. cité ; S. Mayaka Manitu, M.M. Lushimba, J. Macq, 
B. Meessen, “Arbitrage d’une controverse de politique de santé: Application d’une démarche délibérative au 
Financement basé sur la Performance en Afrique subsaharienne”, Santé Publique, 27, 3, 2015, p. 425‑434. 
15. E. Paul, L. Albert, B.N.S. Bisala, O. Bodson, E. Bonnet, P. Bossyns, S. Colombo, V. De Brouwere, A. 
Dumont, D.S. Eclou, K. Gyselinck, F. Hane, B. Marchal, R. Meloni, M. Noirhomme, J.-P. Noterman, G. Ooms, 
O.M. Samb, F. Ssengooba, L. Touré, A.-M. Turcotte-Tremblay, S. Van Belle, P. Vinard, V. Ridde, V. De 
Brouwere, A. Dumont, D.S. Eclou, K. Gyselinck, F. Ssengooba, L. Touré, “Performance-based financing in 
low-income and middle-income countries: isn’t it time for a rethink?”, BMJ Global Health, 3, 2018, p. e000664. 
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response of African experts involved in the implementation of the PBF was, among others, to 
point out that this criticism overlooked their role16. Keeping in mind this highly polarised 
context helps cast light on both the efforts undertaken to make the PBF model travel and the 
ways it has been comprehended in national spaces.  
The final strand of social science research on PBF, and in particular the work of Lara Gautier17, 
shows the central role of a range of individuals, international organisations, and interest groups 
in the global promotion of PBF. International donors are described as both the leading 
promoters and co-implementers of the approach18. Maria Paola Bertone and colleagues19 argue 
that post-conflict countries seem particularly receptive to PBF, probably because they are 
environments frequently influenced by external actors, often open to reform, and generally 
inclined to rely on contract-based mechanisms (rather than interpersonal trust, which is often 
fragile in post-conflict situations). The present paper further develops this strand of research 
by integrating into it the concept of the travelling model. It studies PBF beyond its 
dissemination phase and opens up a new field of research that looks into context-specific 
strategic interplays and practices of PBF implementation. 
The travel of performance-based financing 
Calling PBF “a model that travels” is a given for PBF researchers, promoters, and practitioners 
alike. However, it is only 12 years after the first African journey of the PBF, from Rwanda to 
Burundi in 2005, that the concept of travelling model was first applied to PBF by French socio-
anthropologists of development20. The term was then taken up by voices critical of PBF in the 
world of global health21. PBF seems, indeed, a particularly good illustration of the concept 
initially formulated by Richard Rottenburg in 200222 and developed by Jean-Pierre Olivier de 
Sardan23. Following the latter's approach, we can, first of all, distinguish a rationality, a stylised 
and therefore exportable explanatory mechanism: payment for the performance of health 
facilities, which is presented as an incentive for health facilities staff to work better. Then, there 
are mechanisms which are the "institutional, technical and operational" components that allow 
the implementation of the model, and which are, again, very visible in the case of the PBF. 
Without going into technical details, these include "performance indicators", "performance 
procurement and performance verification agencies" and a range of instruments that are 
presented in the procedural manual, the reference document on PBF at country level. The 
multiplication of trips and the identification of a "certified exemplary experience", an original 
success story, also contribute to the consolidation of the model. This is the pilot experience of 
                                                             
16. S. Mayaka Manitu, L. Tembey, E. Bigirimana, C.Y. Dossouvi, O. Basenya, E. Mago, P. Mushagalusa 
Salongo, A. Zongo, F. Verinumbe, “Towards constructive rethinking of PBF: perspectives of implementers in 
sub-Saharan Africa”, BMJ Global Health, 3, 5, 2018, p. e001036. 
17. L. Gautier, J. Tosun, M. De Allegri, V. Ridde, “How do diffusion entrepreneurs spread policies? Insights 
from performance-based financing in Sub-Saharan Africa”, World Development, 110, 2018, p. 160‑175 ; L. 
Gautier, V. Ridde, “Health financing policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: government ownership or donors’ 
influence? A scoping review of policymaking processes”, Global Health Research and Policy, 2, 1, 2017. 
18. L. Gautier, V. Ridde "Health financing…", art. cité.   
19. M.P. Bertone et al., “Context matters.. ", art. cité. 
20. P. Lavigne Delville, "Pour une socio-anthropologie de l'action publique in les pays 'sous régime d'aide'", 
Anthropologie & développement, 45, 2017, p. 33‑64 ; J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, “Les modèles voyageurs à 
l’épreuve des contextes et des normes pratiques : le cas de la santé maternelle”, in D. Pourette, C. Mattern, C. 
Bellas-Cabane, B. Ravololomanga (ed.), Femmes, enfants : Anthropologie et santé à partir de Madagascar, 
Paris, 2018, p. 83‑100. 
21. E. Paul et al., “Performance-based financing…”, art. cité. 
22. R. Rottenburg, Far-fetched facts: a parable of development aid (Vol. 2). 2002. Lucius & Lucius. 
23. J.-P. Olivier de Sardan”Les modèles voyageurs…”, art. cité. 
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Rwanda in 2002-200524, and, increasingly so, the experience of Burundi. Two other significant 
elements also contribute to the characterisation of PBF as the travelling model par excellence. 
The first is the easy identification of those whom Laura Gautier and her colleagues described 
as the "dissemination entrepreneurs"25, or, to use the words of a Burundi Ministry of Health 
official, the "PBF traders". Among these most visible promoters are institutions such as the 
World Bank and the Dutch NGO Cordaid, and individuals such as the authors of the 
Performance-Based Financing Toolkit published in three languages, French, English, and 
Spanish, by the World Bank in 201426. They are fully assuming their role in promoting the 
model27. 
The second element is the presence of an impressive dissemination infrastructure, which has 
few equals in the world of global health. Early on, PBF got its own conferences (for example 
in Antwerp in 2006 or Bujumbura in 2009), blogs, and even courses (such as the one organised 
by the consultancy firm SINA Health since 2007)28. A Community of Practice (CoP) ─a group 
of people working together to develop solutions to problems encountered in their professional 
practice29─ was created in 2010. Three years later, it passed the 1000-member mark30. In 
addition to international consultants, the CoP includes a large number of middle and senior 
managers from ministries of health and NGOs who are involved in PBF implementation. It also 
brings together former learners of the PBF courses. It is an active network: for example, during 
its first year of existence, its online discussion forum saw a new topic of discussion emerging 
every two days31. Most discussions focus on technical issues of setting up PBF, PBF-related 
events, and training and employment opportunities. It seems that the CoP has played, and 
continues to play, a central role in making PBF the travelling model par excellence. Indeed, the 
existence of a network whose members are in regular contact ─online and at conferences─ 
structures and organises ideas and initiatives, creating a form of practice expected from the 
PBF. Bruno Meessen, one of the main facilitators of the CoP, presents it as essential to improve 
the mechanism and implementation of PBF, offering a space for learning and debate, returns 
to scale, and exchanges of experience32, whereas Elisabeth Paul and her colleagues see it as an 
instrument for imposing PBF orthodoxy33. In any case, the CoP helps build a pool of new 
promoters of the model, thereby improving its life expectancy.  
At the end of the travel 
Using the case of PBF to highlight the existence of travelling models in global health is not 
very original. It may even present a danger if the analysis is limited to denouncing the apparent 
"cut and paste" approach of global health. The danger is that a hasty use of the vocabulary 
                                                             
24. Itself inspired by schemes in Cambodia and Afghanistan. Interestingly, there are extremely few parallels, in 
the academic and grey literature, with the New Public Management of European, British but also French health 
systems. As is the PBF moded described in this article, the French Tariffing by Activity (T2A) is a financing 
system based on volume of activity rather than authorisation of expenditure.  
25. L. Gautier et al., “How do diffusion…”, art. cité. 
26. Fritsche, G.B., Soeters, R. and Meessen, B., 2014. Performance-based financing toolkit. The World Bank. 
27. M.P. Bertone et al., “Context matters…”, art. cité. for a mpping of such diffusion. 
28. As of 25.03.2019, nearly 80 courses had already been organised, in French and English, and the freely 
available training manual was nearly 246 pages long. 
29. E. Wenger, et W. Snyder, W.M., Communities of practice: The organizational frontier. Harvard business 
review, 78(1), 2000, p.139-146. 
30. 2,528 members as of December 3, 2018 https://groups.google.com/d/forum/performance-based-financing. 
31. 183 topics, in French and English, in one year. 
32. B. Meessen, S. Kouanda, L. Musango, F. Richard, V. Ridde, A. Soucat, “Communities of practice: The 
missing link for knowledge management on implementation issues in low-income countries?”, Tropical 
Medicine and International Health, 16, 8, 2011, p. 1007‑1014. 
33. E. Paul et al., “Performance-based financing…”, art. cité. 
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travelling model, focusing too much on dissemination, reduces PBF to the simple imposition 
of a globalised idea (promoted by experts from the North) on a population in the Global 
South34, thereby denying national actors any form of agency. The balance of power is 
undeniable, and some cases such as Tanzania indicate a particularly coercive attitude on the 
part of the donors promoting the PBF35, but this should not be an excuse for not looking closely 
at the realities experienced in each context. Returning to Rottenburg is useful here, as his theory 
of the travelling model draws on the sociology of translation and emphasises the need to pay 
attention to "practices, materialities, and technologies". In fact, the diffusion of the model from 
one context to another is less important than what comes after: "a process of translation then 
begins, this abstraction is rejected, augmented, altered, and/or extended. [...] A travelling model 
implies an interpretation of the social world, but it also provides the agency to change this 
world"36. If one agrees that there will always be a form of translation, resistance, and 
acculturation to the model, taking a principled normative position on the effects of PBF simply 
because it is derived from a circulating idea is not tenable, unless one adopts a radically 
essentialist view.  
The reterritorialisation of the travelling model plays out in contexts that Jean-Pierre Olivier de 
Sardan describes as "structural" and "pragmatic". The first denotes formal and institutional 
adaptations: in the case of the PBF, an abundant literature documents different architectural 
variants of the PBF, such as the choice of certain indicators or a particular type of verification 
system37. This is what Sally Engle Merry calls the "vernacularization" of a transnational idea 
by replication: the rationality of the model remains generally unchanged, but its 
implementation echoes a contextualised understanding38. The debate in global public health on 
the acculturation of PBF often remains at this level39. However, another reterritorialization also 
takes place in the "pragmatic context": it plays on the normative gap, i.e., the "gap between the 
rules and procedures integrated" into PBF and the "rules and procedures in force"40. PBF leads 
to unanticipated adaptations. An example reported in Benin is the "seasonal" filling in of the 
performance registers used to define the level of performance: this filling does not occur at the 
time of each patient's visit but when the "season" of the performance verification comes41.  
In addition to these two contexts, Rottenburg suggests a third one, which is less often explored 
and which I will describe as "strategic". In this case, reterritorialisation is best understood as 
the strategic and legalised “hijacking” of the model to (also) resolve issues that are apparently 
unrelated to the issues the model was meant to resolve. It is not a departure from the rules in 
force, or even a perverse effect; rather, it is an open and deliberate adaptation that takes the 
                                                             
34. This risk is not new; it echoes the criticisms of post-development theory. See for example: J.N. Pieterse, 
"After post-development", Third World Quarterly, 21, 2, 2000, p. 175‑191. 
35. V. Chimhutu, M. Tjomsland, N.G. Songstad, M. Mrisho, K.M. Moland, “Introducing payment for 
performance in the health sector of Tanzania- the policy process”, Globalization and Health, 2015, p. 1‑10 ; A. 
Barnes, G. Wallace Brown, S. Harman, Global Politics of Health Reform in Africa: Performance, Participation, 
and Policy, London, 2015. 
36. M. Schnegg, T. Linke, “Travelling models of participation: Global ideas and local translations of water 
management in Namibia”, International Journal of the Commons, 10, 2, 2016, p. 803 
37. D. Renmans et al., “Performance-based financing…”, art. cité 
38. S.E. Merry, P. Levitt, "The Vernacularization of Women's Human Rights,”in S. Merry, P. Levitt. Hopgood, 
J. Snyder, L. Vinjamuri (ed.), Human Rights Futures, Cambridge, 2018, p. 213‑236 ; S.E. Merry, “Transnational 
Human Rights and Local Activism”, American Anthroplogist, 108, 1, 2006, p. 38‑51. 
39. L. Gautier et al., “How do diffusion entrepreneurs spread policies?... “, art. cité ; A. Barnes et al., Global 
Politics…, op. cit. 
40. J.P. Olivier de Sardan, A. Diarra, M. Moha, “Travelling models and the challenge of pragmatic contexts and 
practical norms: The case of maternal health”, Health Research Policy and Systems, 15, Suppl 1, 2017. 
41. E. Paul, N. Sossouhounto, D.S. Eclou, “Local stakeholders’ perceptions about the introduction of 
performance-based financing in Benin: a case study in two health districts”, International Journal of Health 
Policy and Management, 3, 4, 2014, p. 207‑214. 
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model into a new territory. The case of Burundi, which I develop below, seems to be an 
excellent example of such strategic reterritorialisation. 
PBF in Burundi: Technocrats and Politicians 
Along with Rwanda42, Burundi is often considered the PBF success story on the African 
continent. The two examples are used in efforts to disseminate the PBF model, such as the 
World Bank's PBF Toolkit and SINA Health's PBF training manual43. As a country with an 
economy and political regime sometimes perceived (at least until the political crisis of 2015) 
as less distinctively singular than those of its northern neighbour, Burundi seems to 
demonstrate that PBF is within reach of all countries. The analysis below will nuance this 
picture, suggesting that Burundi's PBF has, in fact, fundamentally reinvented itself in the 
context of its unique situation and historicity. 
The arrival of PBF in Burundi has already been documented in other publications44. Strong of 
their experience in Rwanda, the Dutch NGOs Cordaid and HealthNet TPO suggest to 
experiment with PBF in 2002, and then, more substantially, from 2004. The experiment begins 
in three provinces in 2006 and is extended to six other provinces in 2008 (the country counted 
seventeen provinces at the time). It is the beginning of the structural reterritorialisation of the 
PBF model: the expected mechanisms and practices are adapted to the context. The process is 
based on a number of elements: (1) the conclusions of the General States of Health in Burundi 
which had proposed contracting as an option for reforming the health system, an idea developed 
in a workshop on contracting organised by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 
Bujumbura in 2006 and then in the National Health Development Plan 2006-2010; (2) study 
trips to Rwanda; and (3) training sessions organised by the Dutch consulting firm SINA 
Health45. Inside the Ministry of Health, PBF does not gather unanimous support. Among the 
objections in the different departments─positions within the Ministry do not seem to dictate 
views─, are questions that are still debated today (according to Ministry of Health staff): why 
introduce a bonus system for tasks for which civil servants are already receiving a salary? Will 
financial incentives not undermine the ethics and vocation of health-care staff? Between 2006 
and 2009, the debate on the translation of the PBF model, or even the possibility of its travel, 
is in full swing. It echoes the global confrontation between, on the one hand, a public health 
approach implemented and thought out by doctors (often, but not always, public health doctors) 
and, on the other hand, an approach belonging to a generation of Ministry and NGO executives 
trained in health economics in Europe but also in African institutions such as the African Centre 
for Higher Studies in Management (CESAG) in Dakar. In 2009, an agreement is reached in the 
Ministry of Health: the PBF approach will be scaled up from April 201046. What happened? 
Which sort of “translation” has taken place? 
Of course, and Lara Gautier's work has already elaborated this point, “diffusion entrepreneurs” 
played their part. Following her typology, we can identify a moral argument, repeated in almost 
all interviews, that it would be irresponsible to continue with an “inefficient input model”, i.e. 
financing of health facilities solely using inputs (drugs, human resources, equipment, etc.). The 
                                                             
42. A. Barnes et al., Global Politics…, op. cit. 
43. In its January 2019 version, Burundi is more often cited than Rwanda (40 vs 23 times). 
44. E. Bigirimana, L. Ntakarutimana, J. Manirambona, O. Basenya, T. Minubona, Le Financement Basé sur la 
Performance: de la phase de projet pilote à l’intégration au niveau du système de santé : Etude de cas du 
Burundi 2004-2014, Anvers, 2016 ; J.-B. Falisse, J. Ndayishimiye, V. Kamenyero, M. Bossuyt, “Performance-
based financing in the context of selective free health-care: An evaluation of its effects on the use of primary 
health-care services in Burundi using routine data”, Health Policy and Planning, 30, 10, 2015, p. 1251‑1260. 
45. E. Bigirimana et al., Le Financement…, op. cit. 
46. Interview 4 (Ministry of Health executive, November 2018). The main tension was whether performance 
audit should be internal or external to the Ministry. Eventually, joint committees were created. 
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arguments of the dissemination entrepreneurs are also based on PBF expertise. Between 2006 
and 2010, visits to pilot health facilities and graphs comparing pilot provinces and adjacent 
provinces that did not benefit from the approach are used to convince sceptics. It is important 
to note that these are not strictly speaking scientific arguments; the first impact studies were 
not published until 2014 and show a limited effect of PBF on the use of primary health care47. 
Finally, the argument is also financial; not all donors and potential international partners 
support the PBF approach from the outset ─DfID (the British Department for International 
Development) and Médecins sans Frontières, for example, are fiercely opposed to PBF─ but, 
by the end of 2009, the World Bank and its promises to finance the PBF throw all their weight 
behind PBF48. It is interesting to note that the market principles on which PBF is based ─among 
others the autonomy of management of health structures, evaluation based on indicators, and 
payment based on results─ have emerged almost unaltered from this first phase of 
reterritorialisation. At first glance, it may seem that the travel of PBF to Burundi is mainly a 
simple replication of the Rwandan model. 
The above elements help understand why PBF was adopted and scaled up, but they explain less 
well how it was implemented and how, from the end of the 2000s, PBF became quite central 
to the Burundian health system. In 2010 and even more so in 2018, the Ministry of Health is in 
charge of PBF. The Burundian government, which is facing major financial problems due to 
the political crisis and the reduction in aid from donors such as the European Union, has 
committed to spending, and continues to spend, 1.4% of its GDP on PBF49. Why such a place? 
An argument that emerges from the grey literature and interviews with Ministry of Health 
officials is that there has been a window of opportunity, a "windfall effect" as a Ministry of 
Health technician explained. The set up of PBF in Burundi was the product of intense advocacy 
efforts by national and international actors, but the scheme has also been used by senior 
Ministry of Health officials to make progress on two important issues that were not strictly 
speaking related to PBF: the reorganisation of the Ministry of Health and the health system 
and, to a probably much more significant extent, the implementation of the policy of free 
health-care for children under five and pregnant women. 
New paradigm, new elites? 
The first aspect refers to the implementation of a managerial approach that benefits a series of 
executives with a more technocratic profile. If, as revealed in the interviews, "everyone in the 
ministry is interested in the possibility of improving their salary via PBF"50, the introduction 
of PBF is also an opportunity to put in place new planning, monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms and to systematise the identification of problems through a culture of audit at all 
levels, including those not (yet) under PBF. A proper understanding of the nature of these 
changes, and the adjustments (and circumventions) thereof, i.e. the question of 
reterritorialization in the pragmatic context, would require ethnographic work within the 
Ministry of Health, looking at practical norms. It is beyond the scope of our research. The 
important point, however, is not so much whether the culture of the Ministry has changed, as 
                                                             
47. Among others J.-B. Falisse et al., “Performance-based…”, art. cité et I. Bonfrer, E. Van de Poel, E. Van 
Doorslaer, “The effects of performance incentives on the utilization and quality of maternal and child care in 
Burundi”, Social Science and Medicine, 123, 2014, p. 96‑104. 
48. Interview 5 (Ministry of Health executive, November 2018). 
49. Ministry of Public Health, Rapport de mise en œuvre du financement basé sur la performance associé à la 
gratuité des soins pour l'année 2017, Bujumbura, 2018. 
50. Interview 5 (Ministry of Health executive, November 2018). 
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suggested by the people we met, some authors51 and the promoters of the PBF, but rather that 
PBF legitimises and strengthens certain individuals and certain departments within the 
Ministry. Those who control PBF dynamics ─such as the Planning Directorate and the National 
Contracting Policy Steering Committee set up to prepare the PBF scale-up─ gain considerable 
influence in the Ministry. In 2010, the latter committee is superseded by the National Technical 
Unit (CTN) in charge of the technical and operational implementation of the PBF. The PBF, 
whose ideas "infiltrate everywhere, at all levels" to use the words of an NGO representative, 
allows a technocratic elite, liked by the PBF's international donors and promoters for its 
technical competence, to assert its place in the Ministry. A similar dynamic is reported with 
the introduction of PBF in other African contexts52. If in 2010 the best experts of the PBF in 
Burundi include some foreigners and Burundians working for NGOs, in 2018 the landscape is 
much more Burundian, and almost exclusively internal to the Ministry of Health. The CTN 
counts among the most experienced health technicians in the country, its president is a former 
Minister of Health, and its vice-president is the former director-general of the National Institute 
of Public Health. In 2012, its other members are senior officials from the Ministry of Health 
─the HIV/AIDS, Human Resources, and Health Statistics Departments─ as well as African 
BPF experts working for the World Bank and the Belgian Technical Cooperation53. 
Occasionally,  “extended CTN” meetings are called in; they include other experts from the 
Ministry but also NGOs. In the field, the different structures created for the implementation of 
the PBF system (including its verification and planning units) recruit from within the Ministry 
and NGOs. A PBF-specific analytical and programmatic capacity has developed, and it has 
allowed the emergence of a new class of Burundian PBF experts who join the internationalised 
global health elite. They are co-opted in institutions that promote the PBF model such as 
Cordaid and the World Bank, and help the PBF travelling model continue its journey to 
countries such as Djibouti, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Chad. Perhaps more fundamentally, they 
are also changing the dynamics of expertise, and therefore of power, within health systems54. 
Within a few years, PBF has become an important element, not to say a cornerstone, of the 
Burundian health system. The consolidation of the power of this new technocracy, with a 
managerial orientation where the old technocracy was more medical, is however taking place 
in a particular strategic context, which is presented now.  
Rescuing the free health-care policy 
The real window of opportunity for PBF, and probably the reason why it has become so central 
in Burundi, is that it has allowed the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance to address 
a thorny issue: the efficient implementation of the policy of free health-care for pregnant 
women and children under five years of age promised by the president of the Republic. In May 
2006, the Ministry of Health public servants learnt, in the media, President Pierre Nkurunziza's 
decision to imminently implement free health-care, one of his electoral campaign's promises55. 
Until then, the Ministry had been opposed the idea, which was seen as the unreasonable 
obsession of foreign organisations present in Burundi such as MSF, DfID and the European 
Commission's Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). No plan for implementing selective free health-care 
existed, and the hastily improvised new policy had almost immediate destabilising effects on 
                                                             
51. M.P. Bertone, B. Meessen, “Studying the link between institutions and health system performance: A 
framework and an illustration with the analysis of two performance-based financing schemes in Burundi”, 
Health Policy and Planning, 28, 8, 2013, p. 847‑857. 
52. A. Barnes et al., Global Politics…, op. cit. 
53. Ministry of Health of Burundi, Manuel de procédures du Financement de Performance, Bujumbura, 2012.  
54. Interview 7 (Ministry of Health senior official, December 2018). 
55. M. Nimpagaritse, M.P. Bertone, “The sudden removal of user fees: The perspective of a frontline manager 
in Burundi”, Health Policy and Planning, 26, 2, 2011. 
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the health system. Health facilities were severely lacking human and financial resources to 
meet the massively growing demand for care, and the situation became tense in many places. 
The system was based on fee-for-service reimbursement: every month, health facilities sent 
their invoices to the Ministry of Health. However, this reimbursement process soon 
accumulated huge delays, regularly up to one year at the beginning of the implementation of 
the policy, and then three to seven months afterwards (according to the Ministry of Health 
officials). Informal payments for supposedly free healthcare services increased. Overall, the 
whole health system weakened significantly, some even called it “on the verge of collapsing”56. 
The survival of the policy was, however, of major strategic importance. On the one hand, 
Burundi had obtained debt remission under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 2006, but on the condition that it 
carried out ambitious health and education programmes. On the other hand, the support base 
of the president was in the poor and rural regions of the country, those that potentially benefited 
most from his selective free health-care policy. The advocates of PBF presented their scheme 
as a ready-made solution to this conundrum. The free health-care system in place was 
administratively cumbersome, to the extent that some health facilities claimed they had to hire 
accountants (which they could not afford to pay), and had a very lengthy disbursement 
procedure going all the way up to the central level of the Ministry of Finance. The PBF model, 
however, used a decentralised and simpler claiming and invoicing system that could be adapted 
to reimburse health facilities for the services they were required to provide free of charge. PBF 
also came with a mechanism to verify the effectiveness of the services paid for ─and 
reimbursement fraud was a concern for the Ministry of Health. The adaptation of the PBF 
model to cover free health-care is relatively simple: the "standard" PBF bonus is replaced by a 
larger amount of money, which includes both the PBF bonus and the reimbursement for the 
service provided under the free health-care policy. The scaling up of PBF, which, in fact, 
corresponded to the coupling of PBF with the free health-care scheme at the national level and 
took place only a few months before the presidential election, was led by the CTN with the 
support of external PBF promoters, consultants, donors and NGOs. Its effects were not long in 
coming: a report from the World Health Organization explains, without citing its sources or a 
precise period, that with PBF, the average time for reimbursement of health facilities for care 
provided free of charge decreased from 85 to 43 days57. The operation also enabled a 
rapprochement between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance, the body 
responsible for reimbursing the costs of free care that also managed the PBF funds. 
It is thanks to the integration of selective free health-care, an invention that differs substantially 
from the Rwandan model, that the PBF travelling model becomes central and is legitimised in 
Burundi. It should be noted that other countries, such as Sierra Leone, are in a similar situation 
in 2010 with the launch of both PBF and a free health care initiatives58, but their combination 
is never envisaged. Merging PBF with free health-care is not a given. It takes place in Burundi 
for strategic and political reasons, which are lacking in Sierra Leone (where PBF had, at the 
time of writing this article, largely declined). In Burundi, the strength of PBF has been to 
establish itself as a tool for achieving a political agenda. History seems to be repeating itself: 
the apparent success of PBF-free health care has led the minister's office to task the CTN, 
perceived as a unit of excellence, with missions that go beyond the strict framework of the 
PBF, to the extent that some PBF promoters are concerned that it is now too often perceived 
as a panacea59. In addition to pursuing a logic of contracting at the level of the central 
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administration, the CTN has been tasked with finding solutions to improve the functioning of 
the Health Insurance Card (CAM). The card, long moribund, was revived by Vice-President 
Gervais Rufyikiri in 2012 as a means for Burundians to access basic health services at no cost 
other than a modest annual contribution (less than two euros). This decision was not planned 
with the Ministry of Health, and problems soon became apparent. The similarity with the 
coupling of selective free health care and PBF at the end of the 2000s is striking: the PBF and 
its CTN, both typical technocratic objects related to “standardised” global health approaches, 
come to the rescue of political decisions. The CAM, like the policy of selective free health care, 
fits well within the global health universal health coverage agenda. However, one should not 
be mistaken, what is happening is not a dialogue between population, technicians and 
politicians: the minister, who is at the mercy of the president, exerts regalian power over the 
CTN in a context marked by a high turnover of civil servants (linked to the country's political 
instability). While the scaling up of PBF in 2010 took place in a political space that retained 
democratic openings, the implementation of PBF in the following years took place against the 
background of a populist and increasingly totalitarian regime, with an inclination towards 
universal health coverage. It is not a contradiction: democracy and universal health coverage 
are not necessarily intrinsically linked. Here we can see how, in order to impose itself in its 
strategic context, a global technocratic model (PBF, and more broadly the culture of audit and 
management) participates or is forced to participate to the legitimisation of a political regime 
that is less and less democratic. 
Conclusion 
The fundamental element of the reterritorialisation of the PBF travelling model in Burundi is 
its coupling with the process of reimbursement of costs related to the introduction of partial 
free health care. It goes hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of a new 
technocratic health elite. By identifying different levels of context, but also practices and 
materialities, the framework of the travelling model casts light on the way PBF became central 
in Burundi. However, in order not to reduce our analysis of the translation of the model to its 
mere dissemination, we had to take the concept of the travelling model further, returning to the 
idea of a national context that is also eminently strategic and political. The Burundian actors 
of PBF talk about a "compromise adapted to the country's context while trying to preserve the 
fundamental principles of the approach which ensure a certain technical and financial 
sustainability"60. The tension here is between, on the one hand, the importance of maintaining 
the fundamentals which are synonymous with international financial support and useful 
inclusion in the globalised expertise of the world of global health and, on the other hand, the 
compromise, i.e. the need to be relevant and acceptable in the Burundian political context. The 
case of Burundi includes forms of replication of the Rwandan model. Still, it gains its pre-
eminence by achieving what Sally Engle-Merry calls a hybridisation: with the integration of 
free health care, PBF becomes a truly political object, reformulated by institutions and 
technocratic power. This hybridisation takes place in plain daylight, in a much more visible 
and strategic field than that of pragmatic adaptations and practical norms. There is little doubt 
that the PBF model conveys rather neo-liberal ideas (such as the culture of auditing and 
managerial autonomy), but the debate on PBF must also integrate the possibility of the strategic 
hybridisation of the model. It is at this point that the ideological dimension of the PBF can be 
explored in practice: paradoxically, in the case of Burundi, the hybridisation of the neo-liberal 
principles of the PBF allows the implementation of a policy of free health care typical of a 
welfare state, and vice versa. Of course, even if PBF benefited the universal health coverage 
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agenda in Burundi, it is also not certain that PBF was the one and only way to "save" the policy 
of partial free health care in this context ─but it is the one that was tried, and apparently with 
some success that benefited Burundians (even if the question of the sustainability of financing 
of free health-care comes back regularly, including at the time of writing this article).  
From the moment it is accepted that PBF in Burundi is a hybridisation made of translations and 
reformatting, it is also clear that PBF's journey in Africa, and travelling models in general, are 
best understood as "a multiplicity of parallel paths, unsuccessful attempts and unexpected 
revivals"61 rather than a linear succession of different stages. For example, with the recent 
exception of Côte d'Ivoire, no country has so far coupled PBF and free health-care ─although 
this is the very core of Burundi's “certified exemplary experience”. The reflection carried out 
in this article also raises the question of what must, or can, be evaluated to account for the 
effects of PBF fully: the process of hybridisation, and, to some extent, the hybridised nature of 
PBF, are absent from current academic research that focuses on measuring the effects and on 
the perverse effects of PBF on the use of care and its quality. 
 
The most interesting element of the travelling model discussed in this article is not who or what 
facilitates its journey. It is not even the gaps between structural and pragmatic adaptations. 
Instead, it is the articulation between the process of reterritorialization on the one hand, and 
national political and strategic interests on the other hand. The challenge for future research on 
PBF and other travelling models of global health in Africa and beyond, as PBF is not only an 
African object, will be to understand more deeply under what circumstances hybridisation does 
(or does not) take place. A conceptual framework that could be particularly useful comes from 
the political settlements theory62, for it dissociates political (and economic) power from state 
or parastatal institutions and suggests studying how power, or rather powers, invest and 
distribute institutions, especially those associated with travelling models. 
 
Jean-Benoît Falisse, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh 
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